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Introduction
Transition to the circular economy is a necessary condition for achieving 
sustainable economic growth. The shift to the circular economy requires fun­
damental changes in municipal solid waste (MSW) management.1 The MSW 
management reform has been extensively debated over the last four to five 
years. Unfortunately, as a whole, the MSW management reform in Russia has 
not yielded the expected results. What is more, despite some progress in MSW 
management that has been achieved recently, it is not considered as long last­
ing. This deplorable situation raises questions as to why the waste management 
reform has failed and what prevents Russia and its regions from solving MSW 
management problems and head towards the circular economy.
We describe this problem in the first section of this work. In the second, we 
define waste as an economic category and highlight the main features that may 
help to distinguish waste, goods and resources. The third section puts into the 
question the problems in building the relationships between different interest 
groups in the MSW management system that arise as a result of the existing 
shortcomings in legislation. Then we define services provided by the MSW 
management system based on rivalry and excludability. Section four explains 
how incentive tariffs may solve the waste management problem in the Kalin­
ingrad region.
1. Problem setting
The waste management problem is becoming increasingly urgent all around 
the globe. According to the World Bank, without a global renovation of waste 
management systems, by 2050 humanity will produce 1.7 times more waste 
compared to present levels [1]. In Russia is extremely severe as well. In 2017 
Russia produced 274.4m3 of MSW and only 10% of this quantity was transport­
ed to waste recycling plants (27.9m m3) and 2.2% to incineration plants, whilst 
87% was buried.2
1 Although the transition to the circular economy requires a change in both municipal and 
industrial waste management, this study will focus solely on municipal solid waste.
2 Governmental report On The Conditions and Protection of Environment in the Russian 
Federation in 2017, 2018, Supervised by the Ministry of Natural resources and Ecology 
of the Russian Federation.
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Overflowing authorised landfill sites, mushrooming non-authorised sites, 
and the absence of a waste segregation system necessitated the ‘rubbish reform’ 
of 2017—2019. As of the writing of this article, waste management reform 
in Russia is not considered to be successful. A report issued by the Accounts 
Chamber in 2020 admits that the reform ‘has not met its promise’.3 Moreover, 
if waste burial continues at the same pace, the existing landfill sites will fail to 
accommodate newly generated waste in many Russian regions.
Apart from this, much less volumes of MSW than expected was convert­
ed into resources, including electric power. In 2019, Russian regional operators 
handled 61.15m tonnes of MSW, 29.7% of which was recycled and less than 5% 
put back into production (this includes recycling,4 regeneration,5 and recovery6) 
or reused as a renewable energy source (2.67m tonnes). For comparison, one of 
the world’s leaders in waste management, Sweden, incinerated 50% of MSW 
and recycled most of the rest in 2019 (only 0.8% of the waste generated nation­
wide was buried).7
Although Russia has adopted a national approach to the MSW reform, there 
are regional differences in waste generation and management. Regions and mu­
nicipalities produce different volumes of waste. For example, in the Kaliningrad 
region, the namesake city and its neighbouring municipalities account for most 
regional waste (see fig. 1). In these territories, densely built-up areas experience 
considerable problems with setting up landfill sites and other waste management 
facilities.
3 Report on the Analysis of Implementation of Measures to ensure the Environmental Se­
curity of the Russian Federation as Regarding the Elimination of Accumulated Environ­
mental Damage and the Formation of a Comprehensive Solid Waste Management System. 




4 Recycling is the process of waste treatment, associated with their reuse as raw materials 
while manufacturing products with a similar purpose. Recycling stands for the return of 
waste into the production cycle.
5 Regeneration means putting waste back into a circular process after treatment.
6 Recovery is the retrieval of useful components from waste for repeated use.
7 Avfall Sverige — the Swedish Waste Management Association, 2020, available at: https://
www.avfallsverige.se/in­english/ (accessed: 22.10.2020).
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Fig. 1. Distribution of MSW generation sources
colours show how much MSW is generated by a district:  
red indicates maximum waste production; blue, minimum
Source: Regional Waste Collection, Transport, and Treatment Scheme, Ministry 
of the Natural Resources and Ecology of the Kaliningrad region, available at: https://
minprirody.gov39.ru/deyatelnost/obrashchenie­s­otkhodami/territorialnaya­skhema­
obrashcheniya­s­otkhodami/ (accessed 11.08.2020).
The Kaliningrad region generates up to 1.5m tonnes of waste annually, up to 
2.7m m3 of which is MSW. Figure 2 shows the dynamics of waste produced in 
the region.
Fig. 2. Industrial and household waste production; MSW in the Kaliningrad region  
(the dashed line marks the beginning of the ‘rubbish reform’)
Source: The Drafts of The Governmental reports on the conditions and protection of 
environment in the Russian Federation in 2017, 2018, and 2019 (available at: https://www.
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mnr.gov.ru/docs/proekty_pravovykh_aktov/proekt_gosudarstvennogo_ doklada_o_sostoy­
anii_i_ob_okhrane_okruzhayushchey_sredy_v_2017_godu/), 2018 (available at: https://
www.mnr.gov.ru/docs/proekty_pravovykh_aktov/proekt_gosudarstvennogo_doklada_o_




According to a Greenpeace ranking8, 30% of Kaliningrad residential houses 
had access to waste sorting bins in 2018. In 2019, this proportion rose to 59%.9 
As of the end of 2018, in Kaliningrad there were two containers for bulky waste, 
and 313 for plastic. Most of the latter were found in the Leningradsky and Tsen­
tralny districts, albeit the third city’s district, Moskovsky, the largest by area and 
population had the least of the containers for sorted waste.10
The Kaliningrad region ranks lowest among Russia’s territories located in the 
Baltic Sea catchment area in the proportion of recycled and processed waste (up 
to 90% of industrial and household waste remain untreated) [2].
Therefore, the increase in the volume of MSW transported to recycling plants 
is unlikely to be caused by the reform: in 2013, the region transported the record 
42,000 m3 of MSW to recycling plants (2% of the total collected MSW). The 
problems of the transition to the circular economy may lie in how the regional 
operator collects and processes waste (supply side) or in how residents collect 
and segregate it (demand side).
2. Waste as viewed by economics
Economic and other literature does not give an unambiguous definition of 
MSW. To produce a satisfactory one, let us consider what distinguishes MSW 
from other economic categories.
8 I. Skipor. Reyting Greenpeace: kazhdy tretiy zhitel krupnogo goroda Rossii imeet dost­
tup k razdelnomu­sboru [Greenpeace ranking: each third resident of a Russian city has 
access to waste segregation sites], 2020, Greenpeace, available at: https://greenpeace.
ru/blogs/2020/03/12/rejting­greenpeace­kazhdyj­tretij­zhitel­krupnogo­goroda­ros­
sii­imeet­dostup­k­razdelnomu­sboru/ (accessed 14.09.2020).
9 I. Skipor. Reyting Greenpeace: kazhdy tretiy zhitel krupnogo goroda Rossii imeet dostup 
k razdelnomu­sboru [Greenpeace ranking: each third resident of a Russian city has access 
to waste sorting], 2020, Greenpeace, available at: https://greenpeace.ru/blogs/2020/03/12/
rejting­greenpeace­kazhdyj­tretij­zhitel­krupnogo­goroda­rossii­imeet­dostup­k­razdel­
nomu­sboru/ (accessed 14.09.2020).
10 Regional Waste Collection, Transport, and Treatment Scheme, 2020, Ministry of  the 
Natural Resources and Ecology of the Kaliningrad region, available at: https://minpriror­
dy.gov39.ru/deyatelnost/obrashchenie­s­otkhodami/territorialnaya­skhema­obrashcheni­
ya­s­otkhodami/ (accessed 11.08.2020).
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MSW can be considered as ‘an output with no or negative economic value’ 
[3]. This definition captures the central features of waste — the unwillingness or 
inability of the waste holder to use it, directly or indirectly, as a consumer good.
This definition also reveals the problems that researchers face when defining 
waste. The process of MSW generation in itself does not shed light on the differ­
ence between waste and by­products, which are incidental or secondary goods 
produced while manufacturing the main product. Although by­products can be 
sold in the market, their production is not essential for the firm (in terms of mo­
tivation rather than technology) [4]. Unlike by­products, waste cannot be traded 
by definition. Buyers and sellers cannot find each other in the current institutional 
environment and a transaction turns out to be not feasible due to the search fric­
tions in the market.
Differences between waste and by­products are shown schematically in Fig­
ure 4: by­products and the main products are produces with a help of resources, 
and the manufacturing of both is accompanied by waste generation.
  Fig. 4. Differences between waste, the main product, and by­products
Source: prepared by the authors
When not bought by­products are considered as waste. If the costs of turning 
resources into a product (transformation costs) and the costs of building a con­
tract (transaction costs) change in the economy, waste may be seen as a by­prod­
uct. The reverse process is also possible.
In effect, MSW is any substance or object that has been used for its intended 
purpose (or served its intended function) by the consumer and will not be reused 
[5]. On the one hand, this definition reflects another distinctive feature of waste — 
the unwillingness of the consumer to use the product for its intended purpose. On 
the other hand, it does not consider possible repurposing of a good. For example, 
the product may lose some properties and hence its value (in full or in part). Eco­
nomic agents will decide to discontinue its consumption. In contrast, one may stop 
using a product for a different reason — for instance, because of having consumed 
enough. Furthermore, some products are no longer used and discarded while re­
taining their original features. A good example is food, which retains its qualities 
and can still be used but is, nevertheless, thrown away by the holder.
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An interesting case of changes in the value of a product is related to the sub­
stances used in agriculture (agrochemicals and fertilisers): they can be introduced 
into the soil in amounts greater than needed. In such a case, these substances are 
no longer goods, but they do not fall within the definition of ‘things that the own­
er disposes of or wants to dispose of’ [5].
Since waste is the substances and products that individuals cannot or do not 
want to use any longer [6], this category may be extended to include not only 
products and substances that have fulfilled their function as consumer goods but 
also any other unusable object.
These characteristics of waste can be combined in order to build following 
definition that embrace two central properties of waste: waste is (1) useless and 
unused things and substances which (2) the holder wants to discard in the current 
institutional environment.11
The features of MSW covered by this definition suggest that, in the current 
conditions, waste is a bad that requires elimination. Changes in the institutional 
environment or technology, which impact the level of transaction and transforma­
tion costs [7], may affect the net benefit of disposing of MSW. Alternative ways 
to handle waste may become more profitable as a result. In other words, econom­
ic agents may change their mind and sell rather than discard MSW. In such a case, 
the economic nature of MSW changes — the bad turns into a good or resource.
MSW interpretation as a good or a ‘bad’ is determined by type of market 
defined. On the one hand, MSW can be considered within a market trading in 
goods. Municipal waste will be a bad, and the economic agent will consume a set 
of products that includes both goods and ‘bads’. On the other hand, MSW can be 
defines as a product on the waste market. In the latter case, waste is traded as an 
ordinary good or at a negative price when purchasing them entails losses.
Transition to the circular economy, which is enabled by changes in level of 
transaction and transformation costs facilitated by both businesses and the state 
[8], means exchanging goods that earlier were of no value to their holders. There­
fore, the unique phenomenon of waste disappears upon transition to the circular 
economy.
How could waste be turned into a good or resource? Answering this ques­
tion requires the identification of factors influencing supply and demand. If one 
wants to turn waste into a good or a resource, they need to either increase the 
value sorted and cleaned waste of decrease the cost of waste cleaning, sorting, 
and transporting (including transaction costs) so that to make waste manage­
ment profitable for the actors in the MSW management system. However, the 
11 In the current condition, potential transactions involving such product or substances 
may occur outside market exchanges, and potential customers may attract resources from 
other sources.
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value of waste depends directly on agents willing to use waste in manufacturing 
goods or generating energy (once again, transaction costs must be allowed for). 
Moreover, if a territory produces copious amounts of sorted and cleaned waste,12 
one can have an incentive to start a company that will treat MSW. Hence, to turn 
waste into a resource or good, we need have in mind three necessary conditions: 
waste should be pure, considerable quantities of waste are to be produced and 
demanded.
All the above mentioned definitions have one common feature: there should 
exist a holder of waste who wants to dispose of it. This turns out to be especially 
important when we consider negative externalities (the impact of discarded waste 
on the environment and the wellbeing of other agents) that emerge in the MSW 
management. If the waste holder neglects negative externalities when disposing 
of waste, the amount of goods/bads that are produced in the economy is ineffec­
tive. Still, it is often difficult to establish the actual ownership of waste. This is 
yet another obstacle on the road to the circular economy.
3. Obstacles on the way to the circular economy: the problem of an 
MSW management system
To understand what stands in the way to the circular economy, it is vital to 
have a good idea of the industry of waste management services. These services 
are usually viewed as a pure public good, which is non­excludable and non­ri­
valrous [9]. Indeed, it is almost impossible to exclude individuals (for example, 
non­payers) from consuming these services since clean streets and waste collec­
tion are essential to citizens’ health and environmental protection. Delivered to 
some residents of an area, these services benefit all residents. The basic waste 
management service is not rivalrous, and any individual can use the service with­
out reducing its availability to others.
Despite the public nature of the service, the state or municipalities do not al­
ways draw exclusively on their own resources when fulfilling this function. The 
private sector often comes to rescue [9]. Overall, the extent of involvement of the 
private sector in MSW management is influenced by multiple factors and initial 
conditions (including resource availability, community accountability, and the 
features of the institutional environment). MSW treatment contracts are vulner­
able to changes in the environmental and tax law, as well as to foreign exchange 
risks (if MSW is exported). They are also associated with diseconomies of scale 
and negative externalities. Thus, effective contractual relationships with private 
waste management companies are impossible without transparent rules of play 
and incentives (for example, guarantees) from the state.
12 Separated from other materials to the fullest possible degree. Different types of waste 
management systems require different waste of treating and cleaning waste.
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The MSW management system is a complex comprising disparate elements. 
It includes the collection, sorting, treatment, and disposal of waste. Each element 
of this complex can be considered as a good in its own right. Moreover, these 
elements have features of goods of different types. MSW management can be 
schematised, as shown in figure 5.
Fig. 5. Elements of the waste management complex  
according to excludability and rivalry
Source: prepared by the authors based on [10].
Some components of the MSW management complex can be seen as public 
goods, others as club goods, which are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. There 
are also elements that have features of private goods, for instance, sales of recy­
clable materials.
In traditional MSW management systems, elements that can be classified as 
private or club goods do not play a pivotal role. Most waste is collected and trans­
ported on a centralized basis, and all consumers have equal and almost unlimited 
access to the MSW management system.
Transition to the circular economy alters this pattern — elements falling under 
club or private goods start playing a more prominent role. This change may be a 
result of the elements undergoing modification. For instance, earlier centralised 
waste collection may be performed now by each household individually. This 
way, excludability appears, and the service turns into a club good. Increasing the 
excludability in the waste management system is closely linked to the possibility 
of establishing the ownership of waste. In the circular economy, established own­
ership enables transactions in which waste is seen a recyclable.
Countries that excel in waste management embrace waste sorting, recycling, 
and incineration to minimise burial, increase the excludability of MSW manage­
ment services, and thus facilitate the transition to the circular economy.
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In many other countries, waste burial remains the most common approach 
to waste treatment. Russia is one of them: 90% of the waste produced national­
ly ends up in landfills. The country’s waste management problems are diverse: 
no access to the infrastructure, few incentives for households to sort waste, the 
free­rider problems occurring when it comes to transporting of sorted waste, and 
non­transparent tariff setting.
The lack of access for residents to the waste infrastructure is one of the main 
problems in MSW management [11]. When households do not separate waste, 
an increase in the proportion of recycled MSW is only possible when the waste 
treatment and sorting industry is rapidly developing. What is more, the latter 
process must be accompanied by a gradual introduction of waste sorting rather 
than stand in its way. For example, St Petersburg plans to collect all the waste as 
mixed and take it to sorting stations. The only waste sorting option will be orange 
bins for hazardous waste — mercury­vapour lamps, batteries, and mercury ther­
mometers [12]. Recyclable materials segregated by households are ‘purer’ than 
waste sorted at stations — sorting stations retrieve only 5—15% of recyclables 
from mixed waste [12].
Nevertheless, open and uncontrolled access to the waste sorting infrastructure 
may become another source of problems. Orlov et al. [13] emphasise that the fact 
that third persons can easily remove the sorted waste may discourage waste op­
erators from supporting waste sorting schemes because of the potential losses of 
useful materials.13 Thus, the development of waste sorting requires both dedicated 
bins and controlled access. It is possible to fence off the bins, with access granted 
only to residents of a concrete house.
Greater engagement from residents is essential to a complete transition to 
the circular economy [12—15]. Moreover, the ‘rubbish reform’ has not yet 
made a sea change in the industry but rather led to growing tariffs. And this 
circumstance contributes to the negative attitude of the general public to the 
reform [13].
Tariff differentiation based on the volume of produced waste and waste dis­
posal discounts for households that sort waste has been promoted as a measure 
to motivate residents [14]. The approach based on waste storage targets, which 
is widely used in Russia, is not sufficiently transparent. Particularly, linking the 
targets to the materials composition of the waste as well as its volume raises 
questions [16]. By no means does this approach encourage households to segre­
gate waste.
Another barrier to the circular economy is that the state does not seem interest­
ed in shaping a single policy on tariffs for different stages of waste management, 
13 An equally acute problem is that people may impair the quality of recyclable materials 
by throwing general waste into dedicated bins.
33А. Е. Shastitko, К. А. Ionkina, O. A. Markova, A. N. Morozov
including final waste treatment. Alksnis provides evidence that the gate fee levied 
on access to open landfills sites is lower than that charged for access to sanitary 
landfill sites. This difference in fees does not prompt waste operators to choose 
better alternatives [17]. In other countries, higher fees for using landfill sites and 
incineration are common practice.
All the above problems seem to be a consequence of waste perceived as a bad 
by economic agents. This perception ensues from the definition of waste (see 
section 2). Waste does not have any value for its holder that strives to disposes 
of it, and the lines of waste ownership become blurred. As a result, fuzzy own­
ership of waste makes it impossible to solve the problem of externalities without 
governmental intervention. The only solution is to employ the Pigouvian, or the 
regulatory approach.
In the circular economy, waste ceases to be a bad and becomes a valuable 
resource. All the barriers discussed above are lifted automatically, without gov­
ernmental intervention. Waste operators seek to provide households with the in­
frastructure and set acceptable tariffs, whilst consumers are interested in effec­
tive waste segregation. One of the causes of ‘conflicts over rubbish’ is the fuzzy 
ownership of waste [10]. Let us now consider how ownership is established in 
Russian law execution practices.
The legal framework for MSW management in the Russian Federation is fed­
eral law No. 89 On Industrial and Household Waste, which contains the follow­
ing definition: ‘industrial and household waste are substances or objects that are 
produced in the course of manufacturing, work performance, service provision 
or consumption and that are disposed of, meant for disposal, or designated for 
disposal…’
The same federal law defines MSW as a subtype of industrial and household 
waste as follows: ‘the waste produced in residential properties in the course of 
consumption by individuals or goods that have lost their original use­value in the 
course of usage by individuals satisfying their personal and everyday needs in 
residential properties’.14
Although relationships regarding MSW presuppose the establishment of own­
ership as a foundation for economic exchanges, ownership is absent in both above 
definitions. For comparison, EU countries15 defines waste as ‘any substance or 
14 Federal Law of 24.06.1998 N 89­FZ On industrial and household waste, 1998, Garant, 
available at: http://base.garant.ru/12112084/ (accessed 15.10.2020).
15 National practices of EU countries are guided by Waste Framework Directive 2008/98/
EC, 2008, EUR-Lex, available at: https://eur­lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/98/oj (accessed 
15.03.2021).
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object which the holder16 discards or intends or is required to discard’.17 This way, 
ownership is specified in the initial definition of waste.
Yet, the absence of a reference to the waste holder in the basic definition of 
waste given in Russian laws does not mean that there is no owner. Particularly, 
the transfer of waste ownership is regulated by the Civil Code of the Russian 
Federation. Waste generated industrially belongs to the owner of the resource 
from which it was produced. Yet the law does not specify the holder of municipal 
waste.
The fact that the MSW holder is not defined in regulations causes disputes be­
tween municipal utility management companies (MUMCs) and the Federal Ser­
vice for Supervision of Natural Resources (Rosprirodnadzor). For instance, dis­
putes about environmental charges arose in 2014—2018. Many regional branches 
of Rosprirodnadzor were charging MUMCs for environmental damages.18 The 
amount of the payment was calculated based on the volume of household waste 
collected by the MUMCs. Courts of the first instance and appeal satisfied the 
claims from Rosprirodnadzor, specifying that the households transfer the owner­
ship of waste and the responsibilities of the waste holder to the MUMCs under a 
utility management contract. Yet contracts between MUMCs and MSW carriers 
do not entail a transfer of ownership. Consequently, MUMCs have to pay for 
environmental damage. In 2018, the Court Board on Economic Disputes of the 
Supreme Court ruled that the decisions of the court were wrong and utility man­
agement contracts did not entail a transfer of MSW ownership from households 
to MUMCs.19 Who is the holder of waste after all?
Table 1 lists agents involved in the MSW management system. Surprisingly, 
the definitions given in federal law No. 89 On Industrial and Household Waste 
Management mention only those agents that are immediately engaged in waste 
management (waste operators performing different functions). For comparison, 
EU laws explicitly mention waste producers and holders alongside agents fulfill­
ing waste management functions (dealers and brokers).
16 A waste holder is the waste producer or the natural or legal person who is in possession 
of the waste. A waste producer is anyone whose activities produce waste (original waste 
producer) or anyone who carries out preprocessing, mixing or other operations resulting 
in a change in the nature or composition of this waste (available at: https://eur­lex.europa.
eu/legal­content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32008L0098&from=EN).
17 Waste Framework Directive 2008/98/, 2008, EC EUR-Lex, available at: https://eur­lex.
europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/98/oj (accessed 15.03.2021).
18 Supreme Court has figured out who is the holder of the MSW, 2021, Pravo.Ru, avail­
able at: https://pravo.ru/review/view/147701/ (accessed 15.03.2021).
19 Supreme Court. Decision of the Court Board on Economic Disputes of the Supreme 
Court of the Russia Federation of 31.01.2018 in case N 305­ЭС17—10622, А41—
25079/2016, 2016, Consultant, available at: http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.





Waste treatment MSW operator
regional MSW operator 
federal hazardous waste (classes I and 
II) operators
Russian environmental operator








Source: prepared by the authors based on 20 and 21.
The operators do not become MSW holders after they have received it from 
the owners (legal or natural persons). A contract between the waste holder (this is 
the first time the ‘waste holder’22 is mentioned) and the regional operator does not 
entail a transfer of ultimate ownership23 of waste.
The procedure of establishing waste ownership looks extremely ambiguous 
in the Kaliningrad region because of its special geographical position. Since ma­
jor recyclable plastic consumers are located outside the region (in other Russian 
territories, Lithuania, and Latvia)24, the collected and sorted plastic waste has to 
be taken across the border.25
20 Federal law of 24.06.1998 N 89­FZ On industrial and household waste, 1998, Garant, 
available at: http://base.garant.ru/12112084/ (accessed: 15.03.2021).
21 Waste Framework Directive 2008/98/EC, 2008, European Commission, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/framework/ (accessed: 15.03.2021).
22 Article 24.7 Federal law of 24.06.1998 N 89­FZ On industrial and household waste, 
1998, Garant, available at: http://base.garant.ru/12112084/ (accessed: 15.03.2021).
23 Ultimate ownership is a power (Honoré’s standard incident of ownership) that makes it 
possible in case of uncertainty to establish who is entitled to take the final decision. This 
concept reflects an idea that an owner that is entitled to take the final decision [29].
24 Although some plastic consumers operate in the region, most of the collected plass­
tic was sold to other regions and countries [Vylegzhanina, U. 2018, Stranded at cust­
toms, Rossiyskaya  gazeta [Russian newspaper], available at: https://rg.ru/2018/07/31/
reg­szfo/othody­na­pererabotku­iz­kaliningradskoj­oblasti­stali­zolotymi.html (accessed 
13.08.2020) (in Russ.)]
25 Despite the demand for plastic from companies involved in regeneration, most Kalininn­
grad plastic ends up in landfill: according to the Zeleny Front interregional environmental 
non-profit organisation, only 10% of plastic waste is recycled in the region [Household 
solid waste situation. Kaliningrad region, 2020, Zeleny Front, available at: http://green:­
front.su/post/5293 (accessed 25.10.2020) (in Russ.)].
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The special economic status of the Kaliningrad region (it is a special eco­
nomic zone) allows local entrepreneurs to import goods for personal use with­
out paying customs fees. Yet such goods are considered bonded and cannot be 
brought to other Russian regions. As the new Customs Code of the Eurasian 
Economic Union came into effect, the local customs started to demand a proof 
of status for any exported good. According to the Customs Code, any good pro­
duced from an imported good is an imported good.26 As a result, Kaliningrad 
plastic recycling businesses had to pay customs duties and VAT as if they were 
exporting a new good manufactured from imported materials.27 If the waste is of 
unclear ownership or has come from MSW, it is impossible to provide a proof of 
origin of the good (a recyclable in this case).28 Some companies stopped selling 
plastic to other Russian regions, and this aggravated the situation even further. 
The price of plastic went down in Lithuania and Latvia in 201829, probably be­
cause some Kaliningrad companies, unable to sell plastic to Russia for their 
economic benefit, had switched to those countries.
A manufacturer of number plate frames, ARS, which used the packaging of 
Kia and Hyundai CKD kits assembled at Kaliningrad plants as raw material, sued 
the Federal Customs Service of Russia (FCS). In 2019, the Supreme Court ac­
knowledged the viability of the claim brought by ARS against the FCS and de­
cided that the waste had lost its value in the course of use (in accordance with 
its original purpose) and thus could be considered a good fully produced in the 
Russian Federation.30
To solve the problems of ownership blurring, it was proposed to supplement 
the definition given in federal law No. 16 On the Special Economic Zone in the 
26 Customs Code of the Eurasian Economic Union, 2021, Consultant, available at: http://
www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_215315/ (accessed: 15.03.2021).
27 Kuznetsova, D. 2019, In the Kaliningrad region recyclable material collectors are ree­
fusing plastic, Obshchestvennoe Televidenie Rossii [Public Television of Russia], availai­
ble at: https://otr­online.ru/news/v­kaliningradskoy­oblasti­sborshchiki­vtorsyrya­otkazy­
vayutsya­ prinimat­plastik­134907.html (accessed 12.10.2020) (in Russ.).
28 Vylegzhanina, U. 2018, Stranded at customs, Rossiyskaya  gazeta [Russian newspaa­
per], available at: https://rg.ru/2018/07/31/reg­szfo/othody­na­pererabotku­iz­kalinin­
gradskoj­oblasti­stali­zolotymi.html (accessed 13.08.2020) (in Russ.) /
29 After new Customs Code of the Eurasian Economic Union came into effect on the 1st 
of January 2018.
30 Supreme Court. Decision of the Court Board on Economic Disputes of the Supreme 
Court of the Russia Federation of 31.01.2018 in case N 305­ЭС17—10622, А41—
25079/2016, 2016, Consultant, available at: http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.
cgi?req=doc; base=ARB; n=526857#0006818497252045752 (accessed 12.10.2020).
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Kaliningrad region31 with the term final consumption.32 The resulting definition 
would draw a line between goods and waste. As of the writing of this article, an 
amendment to federal law No. 16 has received a positive feedback ‘as a result of 
the regulatory impact assessment’. As demonstrated above, the solution to the 
problem may lie in establishing the ownership of waste. In such a case, it will 
be required to calibrate the mechanism for establishing ownership of waste or 
to use incentive tariffs to encourage waste management stakeholders to acquire 
ownership of MSW.
4. Incentive tariff as a solution to the problem.  
The untapped potential of Kaliningrad
As auditors of the Accounts Chamber emphasise, ‘the situation in this area [in 
the area of MSW management — authors] is still unfavourable’, and the reform 
‘has not yet led to the expected results’33. In the Kaliningrad region, the only 
outcome of the reform was a rise in tariffs for households and the replacement 
of many waste carriers by a single one — the regional operator. The MSW col­
lection routes did not change, and most waste is still taken to landfill sites.34 The 
future of the reform depends on the actions of regional authorities, which are 
responsible for arranging the MSW management system.
31 Federal law of 10 January 2006 No. 16­FZ On the Special Economic Zone in the KaF­
liningrad region and amendments to some regulations of the Russian Federation (current 
version), 2006, Consultant, available at: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_
LAW_57687/ (accessed 15.03.2021).
32 Final consumption is the use of a good, following which the good is no longer suitable 
for the intended purpose, or usage that results in the impossibility of using the good, its 
components and materials, particularly due to the physical absence of the good, its com­
ponents, and materials [Draft federal law on amendments to Federal law of 10 January 
2006 No. 16­FZ On the Special Economic Zone in the Kaliningrad region and amende­
ments to some regulations of the Russian Federation, 2006, Federal’nyi portal proektov 
normativnykh pravovykh aktov [Federal portal of draft regulations], available at: https://
regulation.gov.ru/projects#npa=107916 (accessed 15.03.2021)].
33 Report on the results of the expert and analytical study ‘ The analysis of the imple­
mentation of measures to ensure the environmental safety of the Russian Federation, in 
terms of liquidation of objects that accumulate harm and the formation of an integrated 
system for the MSW management’, 2020, Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, 
availavle at: https://ach.gov.ru/upload/iblock/41b/41b02dc50697e6fc57ec2f389a8b68f0.
pdf?_ga= 2.106291210.820111883.1605780584—216807580.1598522839 (accessed: 
15.03.2021).
34 Budrina, N. 2020, This week’s top stories. On the waste reform in the Kaliningrad 
region, RBC, available at: https://kaliningrad.rbc.ru/kaliningrad/07/10/2020/5f7dba499a0­
794788d24ac0ab (accessed 17.10.2020) (in Russ.).
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A Kaliningrad MSW management system should take into account the re­
gion’s needs. The Kaliningrad region is unique in many respects, one of which 
is the predominance of low­ and mid­rise buildings, both new and old, which 
distinguishes Kaliningrad from other regional centres with similar populations. 
Despite this fact, the tariffs set by the regional MSW operator are very close to 
the average across the regions under consideration (see table 2).
Table 2














tariff on the regional 
operator’s services 
(across the region), 2019, 
VAT included2018 2019
Penza 524 9 17 9 60 from 4307.12 to 4408.87 rouble/ tonne2
Lipetsk 510 9 17 4 44 from 492.38 to 548.66 rub/m3 3
Kirov 507 6 15 37 0 from 949.62 to 960.68 rub/m3 4
Cheboksary 492 9 16 0 4
from 449.71 to 456.82 
rub/m3 or from 4208.78 
to 4267.86 rub/tonne 5
Tula 483 6 14 1 1 from 518.25 to 623.02 rub/m3 6
Kaliningrad 475 5 9 30 59 510.75 rub/m
3 or 
3648.24 rub/tonne 7
Kursk 449 9 10 0 34
from 491.12 to 570.11 
rub/m3 or from 2633.16 
to 2463.47 rub/tonne 8
Stavropol 434 10 16 31 9 from 640.01 to 683.56 rub/m3 9
Tver 420 8 12 34 100 606.55 rub/m3 10
Sources: 35, 36, 37, 38.
35 Federal State Statistics Service, Rossikyskiy  statisticheskiy  ezhegodnik  [Russian sta­
tistical yearbook], 2020, available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru/folder/210/document/12994 
(accessed 15.09.2020).
36 Russian cities ranked by tallness of buildings, 2020, Domofond.ru, available at: 
https://www.domofond.ru/statya/reyting_gorodov_rossii_po_vysotnosti_domov/8075 
(accessed 24.10.2020) (in Russ.).
37 Skipor, I. 2020, Greenpeace ranking: each third resident of a large Russian city has acs­
cess to waste sorting, Greenpeace, available at: https://greenpeace.ru/blogs/2020/03/12/
rejting­greenpeace­kazhdyj­tretij­zhitel­krupnogo­goroda­rossii­imeet­dostup­k­razdel­
nomu­sboru/ (accessed 14.09.2020) (in Russ.).
38 Threshold uniform tariffs on MSW treatment by the regional operator, 2020, News.
solidwaste.ru, available at: https://news.solidwaste.ru/predelnye­tarify­na­uslugi­regioi­
nalnogo­operatora/ (accessed 12.01.2020) (in Russ.).
39А. Е. Shastitko, К. А. Ionkina, O. A. Markova, A. N. Morozov
The section below analyses how the number of storeys and some other factors 
can be employed in solving the above­mentioned problems.
Experts argue that the Kaliningrad region recovers a very small proportion 
of MSW because operators are not interested in delivering waste for recycling.39 
At the same time, many Russian recycling plants, which operate below their full 
capacity, have to import waste.40 These companies would buy Russian waste if it 
were properly sorted. Thus, a possible way to break the deadlock in the ‘rubbish’ 
reform is to increase households’ engagement.
Sorted waste is recycled more effectively than mixed waste. Both sorting 
by the operator (or a waste treatment company) and the often costly sorting by 
households are critical. Firstly, some segregated waste is further sorted at special 
facilities. For example, plastic and glass may be arranged by colour and chemical 
composition. Secondly, when stored with other waste, some types of MSW can 
no longer be recycled. Since food waste accounts for a significant part of mixed 
MSW, the latter is often referred to as wet waste. Recycling companies are espe­
cially interested in ‘dry’ waste that has never been in contact with wet materials. 
Only clean paper and cardboard can be recycled. After contacting food waste, 
they can no longer be used as recyclates. Finally, the recycling value of some 
types of MSW depends on its physical integrity. For example, bottles and other 
glassware are more valuable for recycling companies when whole. Once in a bin, 
glassware can be broken, that is why it has to be collected separately at special 
drop­off points. Altogether these factors make waste segregation by households 
the central element of MSW management.
Low engagement from consumers can be viewed as a free­rider problem, 
which is solved by making punishment for non­cooperative behaviour a real 
threat. Another solution is a fir promise of a reward for expected behaviour. As re­
gards MSW management, punishments or rewards may be administered through 
a tariff policy, particularly, by introducing incentive tariffs.
Incentive tariffs have proven their efficiency in increasing consumer engage­
ment in waste sorting. Baltic region states are a good illustration. Germany [18; 
19] and most municipalities of Sweden41 have adopted the pay­as­you­throw 
principle. Similar systems function in other Western European countries, the Re­
public of Korea, and Japan [20; 21]. This approach both encourages residents to 
segregate MSW [21] and reduces the volumes of generated waste by 20—30%, 
as compared to that produced under a fixed rate tariff [21; 22].
39 Budrina, N. 2020, This week’s top stories. On the waste reform in the Kaliningrad 
region, RBC, available at: https://kaliningrad.rbc.ru/kaliningrad/07/10/2020/5f7dba499a­
794788d24ac0ab (accessed 17.10.2020) (in Russ.).
40 Galcheva, A. 2019, Russia has increased plastic waste imports by third, RBC, available 
at: https://www.rbc.ru/economics/30/08/2019/5d67e17f9a7947d966d7fd3d (accessed 
15.03.2021) (in Russ.).
41 Avfall  Sverige  Swedish Waste Management  Association, 2020, available at: https://
www.avfallsverige.se/in­english/ (accessed 22.10.2020).
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Remarkably, despite a common institutional framework of the EU en­
vironmental law and common waste treatment rules, Southern Europe lags 
behind in waste management. This situation has been explained, among 
other things, by the insufficient employment of incentive tariffs in those 
countries [23].42, 43
Incentives tariffs have been proposed as a solution to the problem of moral 
hazard or post­contractual opportunism, which stems from information asym­
metry when the actions of counteracting institutions cannot be observed. Yet, 
unlike the situation of moral hazard, in the latter case, the consumer of MSW 
management services does not take on the obligation to sort waste. This situation 
is somewhat of a social dilemma: a private benefit from the action does not ex­
ceed a public one, and the free-rider problem arises. What is more beneficial to 
an individual is not in society’s best interest.
The approach discussed in the previous section can be used to demonstrate 
that incentives tariffs are an effective solution to the free­rider problem. Such tar­
iffs bring in an element of excludability into access to the waste management sys­
tem, an initially non­excludable good. An incentive tariff means that a consumer 
gets a discount (that is, is rewarded) if they properly sort waste. The discount is 
excludable — if the consumer fails to meet the requirement, they pay more (that 
is a kind of menu pricing scheme). Nevertheless, their access to waste collection 
services is not restricted in any way. Becoming ineligible for the discount is a real 
threat that reconciles private benefits with the public ones.
An incentive tariff can be levied in two ways — on mass or volume. If the 
tariff is levied on mass, the vehicles that collect waste must be equipped with 
weighing devices, and this means extra costs incurred by the operator.
If the tariff is levied on volume, there is no need for additional measure­
ments. Usually, a bin or a bag is used as the measurement unit [24]. In the first 
case, the operator’s staff collect waste as soon as the bin is full. Still, bins may 
vary in volume depending on the needs of a concrete household. This scheme 
is common in the countryside. The second variant means that consumers use 
special rubbish bags of a fixed volume. Sometimes, different types of waste 
are collected in bags of different colours. The operator charges a household 
based on the number of bags. A significant deficiency of this system is that it 
is difficult to use in multi-household buildings since it is next to impossible 
to determine how much waste was produced by each flat. In Germany, for ex­
42 Planelles, M. 2019, Why Spain gets a failing grade when it comes to recycling, El Pais, 
available at: https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2018/02/28/inenglish/1519836799_117305.
html (accessed 17.09.2020).
43 Summary of Recommendations for Spain, 2020, Official  website  of  the  European 
Union, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/framework/pdf/facsheets 
and roadmaps/Roadmap_Spain.pdf (accessed 22.10.2020).
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ample, the tariff is calculated based on the volume generated by several flats 
sharing a bin chute or by the whole building if the rubbish bins are installed 
outdoors.44
All the above suggests that Kaliningrad is a more suitable candidate for an 
incentive tariff scheme than many other Russian regional centres. A unique fea­
ture of the city is the predominance of low­ and mid­rise buildings. Residents of 
multi­household buildings will have to act collectively to economise on waste 
collection. The basic tenet of collective action theory is that the success of joint 
efforts decreases as the number of participants grows [25].45 Thus, the fewer peo­
ple live in a building, the more easily they will reach a consensus over the joint 
action. Moreover, a smaller number of participants means a lower cost of moni­
toring and detection of individual violations.
Such a system should create not only negative (‘cut down on waste, or it’ll 
be the worse for you’), but also positive incentives or residents. In some Swed­
ish and German regions, the collection of recycling bins is free of charge, and 
residents pay only for mixed waste. There are not only negative incentives (if 
mixed waste is thrown into the bins that are collected free of charge, no bins are 
collected). After a series of violations, the operator may stop collecting waste 
from the offenders. All this creates perfect conditions for both waste sorting and 
a reduction in waste volumes.
When discussing incentives created within this system, it is necessary to 
examine opportunistic behaviour. If the tariff depends on the volume or mass, 
people will do their best to minimise it. Some will throw their rubbish into the 
neighbours’ bin, leave it in the street [26], or take up ‘rubbish tourism’.46 The 
need for monitoring, as well as other technical issues, such as weighing and tariff 
calculation, results in extra costs.
The simplest solution is fencing off and roofing a building’s rubbish bins. 
Access to the site will be granted only to the residents of the building and the 
operator’s staff. These precautions will rule out the possibility of unscrupulous 
residents dumping their rubbish in their neighbours’ bins. It is important to un­
derstand that these measures will lead to rubbish accumulating on lawns, in litter 
bins, and other places. This situation calls for control. Economic theory, however, 
suggests that incentives might be more effective than immediate monitoring [27; 
44 Zagumennov, D. 2019, ‘When everyone pays the same, it doesn’t matter how you sort 
rubbish’. Why Germany has defeated landfill], Properm.ru, available at: https://properm.
ru/news/society/177821/ (accessed 23.10.2020).
45 Although this thesis has been repeatedly criticised in the literature (see, for example, 
[30; 31]), the situation in questions is very similar to the classical case: the group has 
homogenous purposes, individual participants contribute equally to the common cause.
46 Zoccatelli, Z., Jaberg, S. 2018, Why the Swiss dump their rubbish in France, Swissinfo.
ch, available at: https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/what­a­waste_why­the­swiss­dump­their­
rubbish­in­france/44238560 (accessed 13.01.2021).
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28]. For example, not only discounts but even negative tariffs can be applied to 
recycle bins, i.e. residents will receive payment for waste collection. In such a 
case, they will be motivated to fill the bins as effectively as possible. The operator 
only has to collect the waste on time.47
The success of any reform depends on public attitudes. If the only incentives 
are fines and increased tariffs, residents will be unlikely to welcome the change. 
Transition to an incentive tariff will be easier if residents themselves decide to 
participate in this system. Otherwise, opposition from society is possible: peo­
ple will link the new scheme with the rising rates. After the reorganisation of the 
industry in 2019, a very peculiar situation developed in Kaliningrad. The revi­
sion of waste collection rates resulted in a 30­fold increase in payments charged 
to the Museum of the World Ocean, although the amount of the waste generated 
by the establishment had not changed.48
Companies specialising in waste sorting and recycling have been active in 
Kaliningrad for a long time, but many residents suspect that sorted waste will 
not be recycled but rather buried at a landfill site.49 These doubts are another 
factor that affects residents’ engagement in waste segregation. The awareness 
campaigns may prove to be ineffective.50 The best solution is to set a positive 
example. For instance, there is a company in Kaliningrad that manufactures fur­
niture from segregated plastic.51 It can process up to 180 tonnes of plastic per 
year, which is obviously insufficient for a region that generates 82,000 tonnes of 
plastic waste annually.52
47 When speaking of sorted waste, it is important to understand that it is a resource rather 
than rubbish. As a rule, waste operators are interested in handling such MSW. Thus, one 
can expect that communal bins will be collected without delays.
48 Museum asked to pay for non­existent waste in Kalinigrad region, 2019, NTV, available 
at: https://www.ntv.ru/novosti/2160341/ (accessed 14.10.2020) (in Russ.).
49 Markov, I. 2020, Tested first-hand: how Kaliningrad is sorting rubbish, Komsomol’skya 
Pravda, available at: https://www.kaliningrad.kp.ru/daily/27091/4164072/ (accessed 
12.10.2020) (in Russ.).
50 Experience shows that consumers know very little about waste fractions — which are 
recyclable and which are not [Markov, I. 2020, Tested first-hand: how Kaliningrad is 
sorting rubbish, Komsomol’skya Pravda, available at: https://www.kaliningrad.kp.ru/dai­
ly/27091/4164072/ (accessed 12.10.2020) (in Russ.).
51 Wastelessness: what the Kaliningrad region makes from waste, 2020, Kaliningrad kgd.
ru  news  portal, available at: https://kgd.ru/news/society/item/91426­bezothodnost­chh­
to­delayut­iz­pererabotannogo­musora­v­kaliningradskoj­oblasti (accessed 24.10.2020) 
(in Russ.).
52 According to the regional waste collection, transport, and treatment scheme, the region 
produces yearly 246,000 tonnes of waste (Table 1.1); plastic comprises a third of this 





Regional and municipal authorities have to support this and similar initia­
tives by granting subsidies for the manufacturing of urban infrastructure from 
recycled plastic. Such infrastructure includes benches, fences, street signs, 
flowerbeds, flower pots, etc. These objects should carry a label saying that 
they were made from recycled waste. Coming across these tangible proofs in 
their everyday lives, residents will see that their segregation efforts will not be 
in vain.
Since Kaliningrad does not share a border with any other Russian territory, 
creating and developing such businesses in the region will alleviate the problem 
of transboundary movement of MSW.53
A further study needs to be carried out into the possibility of granting pref­
erences to businesses using recycled materials as regards state and municipal 
procurement. Naturally, preferences must be granted without violating the law 
and jeopardising competition.
Conclusion
This study set out to establish the reasons why the waste management reform 
had failed and what stood in the way of the circular economy in Russia. Kalinin­
grad was chosen as the test case.
Waste was defined as (1) useless and unused things and substances, (2) 
which the owner wants to dispose of in the current condition of the institutional 
environment. This definition stresses that waste is a bad as compared to goods 
and resources, on the one hand. It also emphasises that waste has an owner, on 
the other. The latter may simplify the internalisation of negative externalities 
associated with waste treatment. The definition also suggests that changes in 
the institutional environment and technology can cause waste to move from 
the category of bads to that of goods and resources. Such transition, however, 
will require a considerable volume and purity of waste, as well as sufficient 
demand for it.
Moreover, the study explored certain aspects of legal relationships in waste 
management and demonstrated that problems in the field might arise from the 
fuzzy ownership of waste and the peculiarities of waste management as a service. 
It is concluded that elements of the MSW management systems have features of 
different types of goods (public, club, and private ones). At the same time, great­
er excludability can cause a change from the category of public goods to that of 
private ones.
53 In 2018, regional companies were faced with the need to pay VAT and customs duties 
when transporting MSW to other Russian regions [Ulyana Vylegzhanina. Zastryali na 
tamozhne [Stranded at customs]. URL: https://rg.ru/2018/07/31/reg­szfo/othody­na­per1­
erabotku­iz­kaliningradskoj­oblasti­stali­zolotymi.html (accessed 13.08.2020).
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Incentive tariffs can increase the proportion of recycled MSW. Furthermore, 
they will provide an effective solution to the free­rider problem if mechanisms to 
counter opportunistic behaviour are developed.
We believe that the Kaliningrad region — a city of low­ and mid­rise build­
ings — is an ideal testing ground for setting incentive tariffs, which require col­
lective action. The fewer people live in a building and the fewer storeys it has, the 
easier it is to act jointly.
The findings suggest that transition to incentive tariffs should be carried 
out on a voluntary basis. In additions, recycled waste may be used to manu­
facture urban infrastructure objects marked with corresponding labels. All this 
will help overcome residents’ negative attitude to the reform and increase en­
gagement in waste segregation. In its turn, the development of recycling in 
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